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Prologue
It was a hot, sunny day in late August.' Six Hong Kong families, along with their tour
guide, waited for the tour bus near Fort Santiago, Manila. 2 Amy Leung wiped away the
sweat from her husband Ken's face. This was the last day of the family's trip to Manila.
The couple talked about how they were going to miss their son, Jason, at the moment
playing with his two sisters. Jason, eighteen, had just graduated from high school in Ca-
nada and was spending the summer with his family in Hong Kong.3 This four-day trip in
Manila would draw his summer vacation to a close before he headed back to Toronto for
college.4 Always a nice, quiet child and a conscientious student, Jason was loved by his
friends and teachers.5 But he neither expected nor desired the love, attention, and bless-
ings that the Hong Kong people were about to shower on him.
It was an oppressively hot August day. Beads of sweat gathered on Rolando Mendoza's
sunburned face as he stared quietly at the approaching Hong Kong tour bus. Mendoza,
fifty-five, was dark-skinned and well built,6 looking like the police officer he used to be.
Mendoza likely still remembered the pride beaming on the faces of his wife and children
as he was named one of Jaycees International's Ten Outstanding Policemen of the Philip-
pines years ago.7 At this moment, however, reliving past glory only added to his pain.
Mendoza planned for that pain to be over very soon, once he had regained the honor he
believed the Philippine government had taken from him.8 Though he was desperate to
draw attention to the injustice he had suffered, Mendoza probably did not expect that his
reputation would outlive him, or desire that his short-term fame would lead to long-last-
ing infamy.
Months have passed since the Hong Kong hostage tragedy occurred in Manila on Au-
gust 23, 2010.9 Amy Leung lost her husband and two daughters in the tragedy, and has
been taking care of Jason, seriously injured in the incident, ever since.' 0 The tension
created by this horrible event has become part of the Philippines' foreign relations with
Hong Kong and China because so many questions have been left unanswered, from Men-
doza's innocence and the actions of the Philippine police during the hostage situation to
whether and how the victims will be compensated.
1. Irene Jay Liu, From Relaxed Joker to Pitiless Killer: How Hostage-taking Turned Deadly, SouTH CHINA
MoRNIG Posr, Aug. 29, 2010, http://cvilll4.tumblr.com (reposted with permission at Saranggola Blog).
2. Id.
3. E.g., Manila Attack Victim Recovering, THE MISSISSAUGA NEWS, Oct. 20, 2011, http://
www.mississauga.com/news/news/article/890007 [hereinafter The Mississauga News].
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. Liu, supra note 1.
7. See, e.g., Alcuin Papa, Who is This Hostage-taking Cop?, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Aug. 23, 2010,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/metro/view/20100823-288385/Who-is-this-hostage-taking-cop.
8. See id.
9. See THE MISSISSAUGA NEWS, supra note 3.
10. Id
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This article has two purposes. First, it seeks to study, from an organized international
law perspective, an incident that deeply affected many Hong Kong people and has been
the focus of much media attention. Second, given the meager scholarship on international
dispute settlement methods, this article attempts to use the Manila hostage tragedy to
explore the factors that should determine which settlement methods are used to resolve
international disputes while reinforcing the role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
in promoting world order.
Part I of this article offers a detailed description of the hostage tragedy and its after-
math. Part H explains why, even assuming that the ICJ had jurisdiction over the dispute
between China/Hong Kong and the Philippines, the Court would have difficulty in find-
ing any meaningful standards to adjudicate it. Part II also examines the advantages and
disadvantages of various dispute settlement methods-including negotiation, mediation,
and adjudication-while focusing on the specific facts of this incident. It argues that, while
certain factors weigh in favor of the ICJ as the proper forum for adjudicating these types
of disputes, the lack of detailed, robust legal standards for adjudication at present means
that such disputes should be resolved by other methods, such as the filing of direct claims
through diplomatic channels. Part III explores further how the framework that has
evolved in Part II helps nations decide whether to submit their cases to the ICJ. By mak-
ing reasonable decisions and submitting the right cases, nations can avoid burdening the
Court and reducing its efficiency. Overall, this article reinforces the significance of the
ICJ as an international adjudicatory body that promotes world order, though it probably
would not serve as a proper forum for the hostage tragedy in Manila.
I. The Manila Hostage Tragedy: Unanswered Questions and Unserved
Justice
On the morning of August 23, 2010, Rolando Mendoza, clad in camouflage jacket and
pants and armed with a .45 caliber handgun and an M16 rifle, took over a Hong Kong
tour bus near Fort Santiago, Manila." The bus was about to take two tour guides and
twenty Hong Kong tourists on a sightseeing tour on the last day of their trip.12 While
serving as the Chief of the Mobile Patrol Unit at the Manila Police District, Mendoza
won seventeen awards and commendations from the Philippine National Police (PNP)
and was declared one of the Ten Outstanding Policemen of the Philippines by Jaycees
International.13 But in 2008 he was charged with extortion; the next year, he was found
guilty of grave misconduct and was subsequently dismissed from his position by the Office
of the Ombudsman without a proper hearing.' 4
11. Liu, supra note 1.
12. Id.
13. Papa, supra note 7.
14. Id. Hotel chef Christian Kalaw alleged that on April 9, 2008, Mendoza and several other officers ac-
costed him over a parking violation, then accused him of being a drug user and tried to extort 3,000 pesos
(Philippine currency) from him. Kalaw also alleged that Mendoza and the other policemen forced him to
swallow a sachet full of shabu, a potent form of amphetamine, and tried to extort 20,000 pesos from him at
the headquarters of the Mobile Patrol. In August 2008, the Manila City Prosecutors Office Eighth Division
dismissed the case after Kalaw did not appear for the preliminary proceedings. On October 17, 2008, the
PNP Internal Affairs Service also recommended the dismissal of the case after Kalaw failed to attend the
dismissal proceedings. Nevertheless, in early 2009, the Office of the Ombudsman took over the case and,
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A. THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM
Mendoza introduced himself to the people on the bus and told them that he had been
wrongfully dismissed from the police force and had lost all of his benefits.15 He then
promised not to hurt anyone, saying, "Be co-operative. If you co-operate, no harm."' 6 He
ordered the bus driver to head for Quirino Grandstand in Rizal Park, a major landmark of
Manila.17 Once the bus arrived at Quirino Grandstand, Mendoza handcuffed the driver to
the steering wheel and taped a piece of paper on the door that listed his grievances and
demands.18 When the Philippine Chief Inspector became aware of the hostage taking and
walked over to the bus, Mendoza made the same claims and demanded reinstatement with
benefits to his previous position.' 9
Around 10:30 a.m., the Hong Kong tour guide on the bus informed the Hong Thai
Travel Agency in Hong Kong of the situation by telephone.20 An hour later, Mendoza
freed the Filipino tour guide and six tourists: an elderly woman who complained of stom-
ach pains, her diabetic husband, and a woman and her two children, as well as a third child
the woman managed to take with her by lying to Mendoza that he was her relative. 21 Two
Filipino photographers who happened to be on the scene boarded the bus to serve as
volunteer hostages in exchange for those releases. 22 By noon, Mendoza released the two
photographers as well, and allowed food and drinks to be brought to the people on the
bus.23 With his guns hanging over his shoulders, he looked calm and cheerful as he
walked down and strolled alongside the bus, chatting to the people who brought the re-
freshments.24 By then, live coverage of the hostage crisis had been provided not only by
media channels in Manila and Hong Kong, but also by Western channels that carried the
news across the world. 25
In the afternoon, Mendoza's brother, wife, and daughter arrived. 26 His wife tried to
speak with him, but he refused. 27 He then posted more handwritten signs on the window:
without conducting a trial, found Mendoza and four other policemen guilty of misconduct and ordered their
dismissal from the service. The five policemen responded with a motion for reconsideration to appeal the
implementation of their dismissal order. Mendoza submitted handwritten requests dated March 15 and 22,
2010 for an early resolution of his case. Id.





20. Natalie Wong, Tour Leader Calmly Sent SOS to Office, THE HONG KONG STANDARD, Aug. 24, 2010,
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news-detail.aspwecat= 1l&artid=102088&sid=29349481&con-type=1&
d-str=20100824&fc=1.
21. Ming Pao, ( l f :) Ek ' 3 WAIi [Lee Ying Chuen: Give Justice
to the Victims, Do Not Direct Anger at the Weak], INMEDIAHK, Aug. 29, 2010, http://www.inmediahk.net/
node/1008084, translated in EastSouthWestNorth Blog, http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20100829_1.htm (last
visited June 26, 2011).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Liu, supra note 1.
25. See e.g., Hong Kong Hostages Killed in Manila Bus Siege, BBC NEWS, Aug. 23, 2010, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific- 11055015.
26. Liu, supra note 1.
27. Id.
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"Big deal will start around 3 p.m. today. Big mistake to correct a big wrong decision"28
and "3 p.m. Deadlock."29 At 2 p.m., his brother, who was also a police officer, attempted
to crash the police barrier and approach the bus.30 The police stopped him and, upon
finding that he was armed, took his gun and admonished him.31 Around 6 p.m., two
negotiators and Mendoza's brother walked to the bus to deliver a letter from the Office of
the Ombudsman that promised to review his case. 32 Mendoza was infuriated and called
the letter "garbage." 33 His brother then told Mendoza that the police had taken his gun
and asked Mendoza "not to give up" until the police returned the gun to him. 34 Mendoza
fired a shot in the air, hitting the bus window. The negotiators then withdrew with the
brother.35 One negotiator recommended to his superiors that the brother be arrested and
charged with obstructing the police. 36
As darkness fell, it started to thunder and rain.37 Mendoza agreed to an interview with a
radio network through his cell phone; when the reporter asked what his "last decision"
was, Mendoza replied that he did not have a decision anymore.38 Noticing that the Ma-
nila Police District SWAT team was arriving, he demanded that they withdraw or he
would kill the passengers. 39 Turning to the television inside the bus, Mendoza saw footage
of the police pinning his brother down to the ground before handcuffing him and forcing
him into a car.40 As if to retaliate against the police, he handcuffed the tour guide to the
handrail of the bus door and herded other hostages to the side of the bus where members
of the SWAT team were crouched outside. 4' He cursed and shouted: "My police brother
is being treated like a pig. . .If they don't release my brother, I will shoot this [tour
guide]!"42
B. "STORMING" THE Bus
At 7:25 p.m., Mendoza fatally shot the tour guide, and then aimed his pistol at the other
passengers.43 The driver watched him shoot a couple of passengers and begged Mendoza
28. Dennis Carcamo, Hostage-Taker: Big Deal After 3 PM, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, Aug. 23, 2010, http://
www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleld=605445&publicationSubCategoryld=200.
29. Sophia Dedace, Yebra: Hostage-taker Intended to Fire First Shot at 3 PM on August 23,
GMANEws.TV, Sept. 9, 2010, http://www.gmanews.tv/100days/story/200336/yebra-hostage-taker-intended
-to-fire-first-shot-at-3-pm-on-aug- 2 3.







37. Pao, supra note 21.
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to spare his life.44 Mendoza shouted at him and forced him to drive the bus. The bus
lurched a few feet forward before the SWAT team shot its tires. 45 A few passengers ran
toward Mendoza to stop him, but he stepped back and shot them.46 Meanwhile, the
driver used a nail cutter to free himself from his handcuffs and jumped out of the win-
dow.47 He ran toward the surrounding crowd, yelling, "They're all dead!"4"
The SWAT commander, upon hearing what the driver said, ordered the team to storm
the bus.49 The drawn-out assault that followed was very different from a quick and effi-
cient "storming" break-in. First, the team pounded the windows with sledgehammers, but
the glass proved far stronger than expected; though the team managed to smash some
windows, they failed to break their way in.50 Then, the team fastened a rope around the
bus door to force it open, but as they tried to pull the door open, the rope snapped.s'
More than forty-five minutes after the initial shots, the first policeman was able to get into
the bus through its safety door, but he withdrew immediately when he found Mendoza
still alive and shooting in the bus. 52 The PNP Special Action Force ran up to the rear of
the bus, but then retreated to avoid crossfire from the SWAT team.53 After another half
hour, the SWAT team threw tear gas into the bus, driving Mendoza to the front of the bus
and into their sights. 54 They shot him in the head and his body fell through the broken
door.ss
C. NIRE LIvEs, ONE INCOMPLETE REPORT, AND THREE FORUMS
Eight people died in addition to Mendoza.5 6 Of the seven tourists who survived, four
were slightly injured, two suffered more critical injuries, and one fell into a deep coma.57
The plight of the Leung family, in particular, stirred the emotions of thousands of Hong
Kong people. Although Amy Leung survived, her husband and two daughters died in the
tragedy.ss Media channels continually aired interviews in which the tearful woman la-
mented the death of her family members: "Part of me wanted to be killed together with
my husband, but then I [thought] of my children. I [thought] that at least one of us should
save ourselves to care for them." 59 In another interview, she stared blankly at the camera,
asking, "Why did [the] authorities not rescue us? There were so many of us on the bus.
















59. Survivors Describe Terrifying Ordeal Inside Bus, CNN, Aug. 25, 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/
WORLD/asiapcf/08/24/philippines.bus.survivors/index.html?iref=NSl#fbid=by-FStHkLOT&wom=fase.
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Why did no one come to rescue us? It's so cruel ... The gunman did not want to kill us,
but when negotiations failed, he opened fire. Why [couldn't] the government give the
money? I don't understand why they couldn't give [him] money." 60 Her son, Jason, who
suffered a severe head injury and fell into a coma, began the long road to a full recovery in
mid-October after finally regaining consciousness. 61
Both the Chinese and Hong Kong governments expressed deep sorrow for the tragedy.
The Hong Kong government abruptly placed the Philippines on its travel blacklist and
advised all of its citizens to exclude the Philippines from their travel itinerary.62 The
Chief Executive of Hong Kong complained that he was unable to get in touch with Presi-
dent Benigno Aquino m of the Philippines by telephone during the siege and criticized
the ways the hostage situation was handled. 63 Beijing urged the Philippines to submit a
"comprehensive, precise, objective" investigatory report.64 President Aquino promised a
"thorough investigation." 65 While unimpressed with how the crisis was handled, he none-
theless defended the actions of the police and blamed the media for worsening the situa-
tion by giving Mendoza a bird's-eye view of the situation.66 Aquino's initial response
deeply enraged the Hong Kong people.67
The tragedy was clearly a result of many factors. Experts criticized the Philippine po-
lice generally for their lack of planning and lack of an effective strategy in the negotiation
with Mendoza; they also criticized the poorly equipped SWAT team for what they deemed
a risky, inefficient assault. 6 For example, a security analyst criticized the police for 1)
their lack of equipment and training; 2) not taking the opportunity to disarm or shoot
Mendoza before the situation escalated, especially when he left the bus and strolled
around without holding his guns-strong indicators that he had let down his guard; 3) not
satisfying Mendoza's demands, if only temporarily, to persuade him to release his hos-
tages; 4) not controlling the media; and 5) using his brother in the negotiation.65
But the investigatory report that the Philippine government released on September 20,
2010 only singled out individuals for blame, including the Mayor of Manila City and the
Manila Police Chief, who left for a nearby restaurant for a meal shortly before Mendoza
started shooting.70 The report accused the Mayor of trying to wait out the situation and
60. Id. During the negotiations, Mendoza translated his retirement benefits, to which he claimed he was
entitled, into monetary terms. See id.
61. See, e.g., THE MISSISSAUGA Niws, supra note 3.
62. Press Release, Security Bureau of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, Hong
Kong Raises the Travel Alert for Philippines to Black (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/
201008/23/P201008230290.htm.
63. E.g., Carlos H. Conde & Kevin Drew, Officials Admit Failings in Manila Hostage Standoff N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/25/world/asia/25phils.htnl.
64. Pia Lee-Brago et al., Hong Kong Sad, Furious, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, Aug. 25, 2010, http://www.phil-
star.com/Article.aspxarticleId=60592 1 &publicationSubCategoryld=63.




68. See, e.g., Ten Things the Philippines Bus Siege Police Got Wrong, BBC NEws, Aug. 24, 2010, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11069616.
69. Id.
70. Min Lee, Hong Kongers Criticize Philippine Hostage Report, THE CHINA POST, Sept. 22, 2010, http://
www.chinapost.com.tw/asia/philippines/2010/09/22/273471/Hong-Kongers.htm.
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the Chief of defying presidential orders to use an elite commando unit instead of a local
SWAT team in the attempt to storm the bus. 71
The Hong Kong government took a diplomatic stance by praising the investigation
committee for recommending action against its own officials, but demanded a definitive
explanation of how the eight victims were killed.72 Hong Kong people, on the other hand,
did not hesitate to express their deep dissatisfaction with the report for leaving too much
unexplained. One legislator, for instance, commented on the report's failure to rule out
the possibility that friendly fire from the police killed some of the tourists, as Philippine
officials previously had conceded that police bullets might have hit some victims. 73 One
survivor complained about the report's failure to explain how Jason Leung, untouched by
bullets, nevertheless suffered a severe head injury.74 A group of Hong Kong lawmakers
issued a motion to the Philippines demanding a formal apology as well as appropriate
compensation. 75 Nevertheless, the Philippine government did not take further action af-
ter releasing the investigatory report.76
Who is responsible for this tragedy and how are they to be judged? There are three
possible forums for judgment. First, a traditional courthouse might be used to try the
Mayor of Manila and the Police Chief on the administrative and criminal charges stated in
the investigation report.77 The second forum is the media, which often turns into a court-
room, especially in cases where the traditional system has become corrupt. Newspapers in
Hong Kong and the Philippines critiqued not merely the professional standards of the
Philippine police, but also the Aquino administration. 78 Finally, the third forum is each
individual's conscience, which acts as his own judge. For instance, a Philippine Daily
Inquirer columnist expressed how "deeply, deeply ashamed" he felt over the incident. 79
While some Filipino citizens were indifferent or defensive, others expressed their condo-
lences toward families of the victims, shame about their government, and even appealed to
God to help redeem their nation.80
D. THE ICJ AS THE FOURTH FORUM?
Because the tragedy appeared to be caused by the collective actions of many parties,
especially the government negotiators and the SWAT team, the trial of several individuals
would not likely remedy the losses of the victims or mend the damage to relations between
the Philippines and Hong Kong and China, despite the wishes of President Aquino.





75. HK Lawmakers Demand Compensation for Manila Hostage Bloodbath, CHANNELNEWSASIA.COM, http://
www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp-asiapacific/view/1078783/1/.html.
76. See id.
77. Lee, supra note 70.
78. E.g., Alex Magno, Immature, THE PHILIPPINE S-TAR, Aug. 28, 2010, http://www.philstar.com/Article.
aspx?articleld=606869&publicationSubCategoryld=64.
79. Conrado de Quiros, Ashamed, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Aug. 25, 2010, http://opin-
ion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/ 2 0100825-288605/Ashamed.
80. E.g., Grief Dismay over Manila Hostage Crisis, SUN STAR, Aug. 25, 2010, http://www.sunstar.com.ph/
davao/grief-dismay-over-manila-hostage-crisis.
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It is not a surprise, then, that some Filipino citizens might feel that the ICJ would be a
proper forum for this dispute.
The next section explains why, even assuming that the ICJ had jurisdiction over this
dispute, the Court would have difficulty in finding any meaningful standards to adjudicate
it. It examines the advantages and disadvantages of various dispute settlement methods.
The section argues that, while certain factors weigh in favor of the ICJ as the proper
forum for adjudicating this dispute and other similar incidents, the present lack of de-
tailed, robust standards for adjudication means they should be resolved by other methods.
Part II develops a framework that guides nations to choose among different dispute settle-
ment methods and whether to resort to the ICJ as a forum of adjudication.
H. Adjudicating the Hostage Tragedy by the ICJ? The (In)Applicability of
Legal Standards
The ICJ, sometimes known as the World Court, has been the "principal judicial organ
of the United Nations" since 1946.81 Under the "statute" of the Court, a multilateral
agreement annexed to the Charter of the United Nations, the ICJ furthers the United
Nation's mandate to facilitate the peaceful resolution of international disputes by acting as
a neutral dispute settlement mechanism. 82 "The Court fulfills this role not only by its
function of adjudication of international disputes.. .but, far more often, disputes which are
an element of the routine interaction of international relations."83 Its statute gives the
Court the power to render binding judgments in "Contentious cases" initiated by one
state against another.84 Moreover, Article 96 of the U.N. Charter entitles both the Gen-
eral Assembly and Security Council to "request the International Court of Justice to give
an advisory opinion on any legal question."ss Other U.N. organs as well as political set-
tlements between the disputing states compliment the Court's judicial activity. 86
As with any court, the ICJ must have jurisdiction over the dispute before it as a precon-
dition to issuing a judgment. Consent of the parties may grant jurisdiction to the Court.
Parties may demonstrate their consent in one of three ways: 1) by special agreement or
compromise, in the context of a particular case; 2) by treaty, such as a multilateral agree-
ment that specifies reference of disputes arising under it to the court; or 3) by advance
81. International Court of Justice Website, The Court, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pl=l&
PHPSESSID=835a9344alf8db5be086782212383598 (last visited July 03, 2011).
82. Stephen M. Schwebel & Dietmar Prager, The International Court offustice: As a Partner in Preventive
Diplomacy, UN CHRONICLE, Summer 1999, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-ml309/is_2_36/
ai575903 11/?tag=content;coll.
83. Id.
84. International Court of Justice Website, Cases, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3 (last vis-
ited July 03, 2011).
85. Schwebel & Prager, supra note 82.
86. Id. For instance, "[tlhe ICJ and the Security Council may act as partners in the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security. While the U.N. Charter confers on the Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, the Court may . . . become involved in the same dispute.
The Court then deals with and resolves the legal aspects of the dispute; the Security Council handles the
political aspects." Id.
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consent to the so-called "compulsory" jurisdiction of the court on terms specified by the
state concerned.87
Despite what Filipino citizens have suggested, it would be highly unlikely for the ICJ to
hear the dispute concerning the alleged negligence or recklessness of the Philippine police
in their negotiations with the hostage taker and in their assault of the bus. The ICJ does
not have compulsory jurisdiction over China, though it does have it over the Philippines.88
It must be noted, however, that both China and the Philippines have entered into the
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Convention).89 Under this
multilateral Convention, if the parties fail to settle on the interpretation or application of
the Convention through negotiation and fail to reach an agreement on the organization of
arbitration, then a party may refer the dispute to the ICJ.90 In addition, China and the
Philippines could agree to submit the dispute to the ICJ by special agreement or compro-
mise, though this would be highly unlikely.9 1
But even assuming the ICJ has jurisdiction, other methods of international dispute set-
tlement may be preferable in resolving similar hostage incidents. Various settlement
methods are set forth in Article 33 of the U.N. Charter, including negotiation, inquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and resorting to the United Na-
tions or other international dispute settlement organizations. 92 "This list of methods re-
flects a 'spectrum or continuum of techniques' ranging from the so-called 'diplomatic
means,' which give control of the outcome primarily to the parties themselves, to the so-
called 'legal means,' which give control of the outcome primarily to a third party or par-
ties."93 This section first explains why third-party dispute settlements are preferable to
negotiation for resolving the Manila hostage dispute. Then, it looks at why formal ICJ
adjudication is preferable to less formal third-party settlement methods. Finally, this sec-
tion delves into why the lack of detailed, robust international standards applicable to this
dispute makes formal ICJ adjudication very difficult. As a result, the best option for
China/Hong Kong is to make a direct claim to the Philippines via diplomatic channels,
without going through any adjudicatory processes.
A. THIRD-PARTY DISPUTE SETTLEMENTS V. NEGOTIATION
Third-party settlements are preferable to a negotiation between China and the Philip-
pines over the Manila hostage dispute. As Professor Louis Sohn points out, "[i]t is an
axiom of international diplomacy that the most efficient method of settling international
87. International Court ofJustice Website, Basis of the Court'sJurisdiction, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdic-
tion/index.php?pl=5&p2=l&p3=2 (last visited July 03, 2011).
88. International Court ofJustice Website, Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Com-
pulsory, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p l=5&p2=1 &p3=3 (last visited July 3, 2011).
89. United Nations Treaty Collection, Participants in the International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=XVIII-5&chapter= 1 8&
lang=en.
90. U.N. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, art. 16, T 1, G.A. Res. 146, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46 (Dec. 17, 1979), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorisni/english- 18-5.pdf.
91. Id. 1 2.
92. U.N. Charter art. 33, 1.
93. Richard B. Bilder, International Third Party Dispute Settlement, 17 DENVERJ. INr'L L. & POL. 471, 480
(1989).
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disputes is through negotiations between the two governments concerned, without any
meddling of third parties, other states or international organizations," and that "in most
instances negotiations lead to a solution." 94 Indeed, "negotiation permits each state maxi-
mum control over both the dispute settlement process and the outcome. . ."9s Conversely,
for "any kind of third-party involvement," especially ICJ adjudication, there is the "risk of
reducing a disputing state's flexibility" to do what it wants and, worse still, of "trapping it
into an undesirable outcome." 96 In addition, negotiation, which favors compromise and
accommodation, is arguably "most likely to preserve good long-term cooperative relations
between the parties . . . . "97 Finally, "negotiation is generally simpler and less costly than
alternative dispute settlement methods."98
The Philippine government should have been able to negotiate with Hong Kong on
matters related to the hostage tragedy, but President Aquino's conduct resulted in an im-
passe in the governments' relationship, thwarting the possibility of a productive out-
come. 99 The President shirked responsibility first by defending the police's actions and
laying blame on the media and then by singling out the Mayor of Manila City and the
Manila Police Chief, among others, for blame.100 Unless the Philippine government now
promises to investigate the questionable conduct of its negotiators and SWAT team which
considering President Aquino's stance is unlikely, it will be very hard for the Philippine
government to regain the trust of the Hong Kong people, salvage its own image, or pre-
serve a good long-term cooperative relationship between Hong Kong and the Philippines.
As a result, more complicated, formal dispute settlement methods need to be undertaken,
even if they take more time and are less flexible.
B. FORMAL ICJ ADJUDICATION V. OTHER THIRD-PARTY SETTLEMENTS
The next step is to examine the pros and cons of formal ICJ adjudication and see why
this method is preferable to other third-party settlement procedures, such as mediation or
arbitration, in resolving the current dispute. First, adjudication, whether through the ICJ
or arbitral tribunals, is better than other methods under certain circumstances. Adjudica-
tion is impersonal and allows concessions without any loss of face.ioi Because it involves a
formal third party decision, neither government is held directly responsible for the out-
come. In disputes where governments have, for various reasons, found it difficult to con-
cede or even compromise by means of negotiations or mediations, adjudication is a
politically useful way to "dispose" of such problems without taking direct responsibility
for concessions.1 02 Hence, adjudication is particularly useful in disputes involving difficult
factual or technical questions where the parties are prepared to compromise but cannot
because of the complexity of the situation.o 3





99. See Hong Kong Warns Against Philippines Travel After Deaths, supra note 65; Lee, supra note 70.
100. See Lee, supra note 70.
101. Bilder, supra note 93, at 486, 489.
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Second, ICJ adjudication is often preferable to arbitral tribunals. Disputing nations
have to agree on the organization of the arbitral tribunal and the selection of arbitrators,
which can be difficult. Compared to arbitral tribunals, the decisions of the ICJ wield
greater authority because of the ICJ's position as the most senior and principal judicial
organ of the United Nations. 04
The impersonal, dispositive, and authoritative nature of ICJ settlement could prove
very advantageous in the Manila hostage dispute. Since the tragedy, President Aquino has
turned away from apparent aloofness toward expressing sympathy, revealed by the shift of
his blame from the media to a few of his own government officials. 05 Nevertheless, when
confronted with the questionable conduct of the negotiation and SWAT teams, how the
victims were killed, and how Jason was injured, he has been unresponsive and evasive, and
made no further concessions or conciliatory gestures.1o6 The Hong Kong and Chinese
governments, in an attempt to preserve their relationships with the Philippines, have been
torn between displays of diplomacy and expressions of anger and dissatisfaction.1 07 JCJ
adjudication would help both the Philippines and Hong Kong to "save face." The Philip-
pines could avoid the embarrassment of having to admit to more wrongdoing by its gov-
ernment officials and Hong Kong could avoid directly accusing the Philippines for its
delayed investigations. In addition, the ICJ could resolve complicated, technical issues
concerning the poorly equipped SWAT team, how the victims were killed, and whether
Jason was injured by Mendoza's bullets or police sledgehammers. By involving the ICJ,
China and the Philippines could move beyond unsatisfactory conversations and break out
of their impasse.
C. RE-EXAMINNG THE HOSTAGE TRAGEDY IMPASSE: WHY NOT THE ICJ?
Adversarial adjudicatory processes are still very much the exception in international re-
lations.0s First, states may be more receptive to intermediate, non-adjudicatory ap-
proaches because they are less public. Adjudication can be openly judgmental by labeling
one party a "lawbreaker" rather than providing for a shared acceptance of responsibil-
ity.109 Second, adjudicating the dispute jeopardizes states' ongoing relationship, and keeps
the focus on the past rather than the future. The adversarial nature of adjudication can
also lead to a "win-lose" decision that may escalate the conflict.110 Third, the law may not
be clear and may also lead to uncertainty in terms of outcomes. This is true particularly in
disputes that involve the application of international law, where there may be uncertainty
regarding the existence of binding legal obligations that govern the dispute.I
To illuminate why, assuming ICJ jurisdiction over the Manila dispute, China should not
take the dispute with the Philippines before the Court and why the Court probably would
not agree to hear the case anyways, it is necessary to study the above three factors in
relation to this incident. The following subsection shows that the first two factors weigh
104. Id. at 492-93.
105. Lee, supra note 70.
106. See Hong Kong Warns Against Pbilippines Travel After Deaths, supra note 65; Lee, supra note 70.
107. See Conde & Drew, supra note 63; Lee, supra note 70.
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heavily in favor of taking the current dispute to the Court. Yet, the third reason-the
existence of applicable law-strongly weighs against that course of action.
1. Preference for Less Public Methods? The Necessity of "Airing Dirty Laundry"
The fact that intermediate, non-adjudicatory dispute settlement approaches might be
less public is not a strong reason for China and the Philippines to avoid bringing the
dispute before the ICJ. The hijacking of the tour bus was already public. The gunman's
actions drew world attention: the media channels in Manila and Hong Kong began re-
porting on the crisis before noon on August 23 and major Western channels provided live
coverage of the crisis.112 While Mendoza aimed to air the "dirty laundry" of what he
deemed to be a corrupt government that unfairly took away his job and benefits, the me-
dia, quite ironically, assisted him in his quest by showing the questionable conduct of a
number of Philippine officials."13 Because its "dirty laundry" has already been aired, the
Philippine government should deal with the incident openly and let a third party deter-
mine whether the government was as culpable as many in Hong Kong/China believe. Any
further evasive act reflects badly on the government and serves to confirm strong suspi-
cion that it was incapable and corrupt.
Furthermore, if the Philippine government was found to be responsible, then the Phil-
ippines would have an opportunity to repent openly for the tragedy. In Honest Patriots:
Loving a Country Enough to Remember Its Misdeeds, Donald W. Shriver, Jr. studies the sig-
nificance of being an "honest patriot.""i 4 Shriver argues that a nation cannot reform itself
unless its citizens confront their nation's wrongdoing through public concrete gestures to
put their past behind them." 5 Shriver also cites William Sloane Coffin who contends that
"bad patriots" are "uncritical lovers" and "loveless critics" of their nations, while "good
patriots" carry on "a lover's quarrel with their country."" 6 Open ICJ adjudication would
force indifferent or defensive Filipinos to confront their government's wrongdoings dur-
ing the tragedy, hopefully turning them into "good patriots."" 7 Also, adjudication could
provide relief to those citizens that felt ashamed and prayed to God for redemption.
Above all, it would redeem the Philippines in the eyes of the world.
2. Retrospective or "Win-Lose" Situation? The Necessity of Breaking a Chain of Abuses
Rather than jeopardizing the ongoing relationship between Hong Kong/China and the
Philippines, adjudication would strengthen those relationships by breaking the chain of
human right abuses surrounding the Manila hostage incident. The tragedy arguably be-
112. Papa, supra note 4.
113. Id.
114. DONALD W. SHRIVER, JR., HONEST PATRIOTs: LoVING A COUNTRY ENOUGH To REMEMBER ITS
MISDEEDS (Oxford Univ. Press 2005). Shriver's book studies how people in Germany and South Africa have
openly repented for the wrongs they did to their fellow countrymen Jews and the black people, and how
American citizens need to do similar acts of remembrance and repentance for African Americans and Indian
Americans. Nevertheless, the general argument concerning public repentance applies broadly to the mis-
treatment of foreign citizens in one's nation.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 3.
117. See id.
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gan when the Philippine government denied Mendoza a fair hearing.1S The abuse of
human rights escalated with Mendoza's violence toward the bus passengers and the po-
lice's negligent and inhumane treatment of the hostages as they attempted to capture
Mendoza. Given the contentious history of Hong Kong and the Philippines, the Manila
hostage tragedy has the potential to escalate the hatred felt by some Hong Kong citizens
toward Filipinos and led to further human rights abuses. Hopefully, ICJ adjudication
would prevent this, resulting in a "win-win" situation instead of hurting the relationship
between the two countries.
Formal adjudication would serve to sooth Hong Kong people's anger toward the Phil-
ippines, which has been directed against Filipino domestic workers. 19 It would discour-
age Hong Kong people from mistreating the workers or firing them without reason. In
the 1970s, Ferdinand Marcos, then-President of the Philippines,120 began his nation's ex-
port of labor in an attempt to improve its poor economy. The increased labor exportation
and the inflow of foreign currency, on which the nation became increasingly dependent,
coincided with the economic rise of Hong Kong in the late 1970s and early 1980s.121
According to the Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, discrimination against these do-
mestic workers, or "Filipino maids," by their employers was common even before the
hostage incident.122 Not long after the tragedy, unions that represent Filipino maids an-
nounced that they had received several reports of angry employers firing the maids in
retaliation.123 One union spokesperson expressed her wish that the Hong Kong govern-
ment would explain to its people that the tragedy was not the fault of Filipino maids.124 A
better method for relieving misplaced anger would be a public apology from the Philip-
pine government coming out of public adjudication.
Soothing Hong Kong people's anger is especially urgent considering that the forced
return of unemployed Filipino domestic workers to the Philippines would burden its poor
and unstable economy, aggravating its human rights conditions. Filipino domestic ser-
vants would have worse working conditions than in Hong Kong. The Philippine govern-
ment has previously professed respect for human rights, including the rights of women.125
A non-governmental organization, the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women, con-
vinced the Philippine Congress to enact a statute in 2003 to eliminate and punish the
118. See Papa, supra note 7; see also supra text accompanying note 9.
119. E.g., Filipino Maids in Hong Kong Sacked After Manila Tourist Deaths, TREND, Aug. 25, 2010, http://
en.trend.az/regions/world/ocountries/1740320.html.
120. Philippine-History.org, Philippine Presidents & Vice-Presidents List, http://www.philippine-his-
tory.org/presidents.htm.
121. Vivian Wee & Amy Sim, Transnational Labour Networks in Female Labor Migration: Mediating Be-
tween Southeast Asian Women Workers and International Labor Markets 1, 14 (Se. Asia Research Ctr.,
Working Paper No. 49, 2003).
122. See, e.g., Shadow Report to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Regard-
ing the Report of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, HONG KONG
HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR (July 2001), available at http://www.hkhrm.org.hk/english/reports/docs/
2001CERDfinal.rtf.
123. TREND, supra note 119.
124. Id.
125. See RE"VSED PENAL CODE, art. 202, Act No. 3815, as amended (Phil.).
VOL. 45, NO. 2
HONG KONG TOUR BUS TRAGEDY 687
trafficking of women and children.126 Nonetheless, violence against women has remained
an issue in the nation.127 Thus, forcing unemployed Filipinas to return to their impover-
ished nation might aggravate violence against Filipinas by encouraging more trafficking of
women and pushing more women into prostitution.
In conclusion, a proper ICJ decision would hopefully lead to a "win-win" situation by
compensating the Hong Kong victims and their families and restoring the Philippines'
reputation as one of the most attractive tourist destinations in Southeast Asia. Since the
tragedy, Hong Kong has placed the Philippines on its travel blacklist, leading to a loss of
tourism revenue.128 A nation where a vast majority of its population lives in substandard
conditions and social welfare and income maintenance programs are virtually nonexistent
cannot afford these losses.129 ICJ adjudication could break the chain of human rights
abuses and end the disastrous consequences of this tragedy.
3. Unclear Laws: The Lack of Detailed, Robust Standards for Adjudication
Though these factors weigh in favor of ICJ adjudication, the uncertainty of the law,
specifically the lack of detailed, robust international legal norms, is a strong factor that
weighs against using the ICJ as a forum. If the ICJ has compulsory jurisdiction over the
case, the dispute can be adjudicated on the basis of the human right norms laid out by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration). Also, the International Conven-
tion Against the Taking of Hostages provides an opportunity to refer the dispute to the
ICJ. As this subsection shows, the Court would very likely have difficulty finding detailed,
robust human rights standards for adjudicating this dispute. The International Conven-
tion Against the Taking of Hostages might provide a viable, but far less direct method of
taking the case to the ICJ. Thus, China/Hong Kong should make a direct claim to the
Philippines via diplomatic channels instead of going through any adjudicatory processes.
a. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Or Was It Ordinary Negligence?
In the U.N. Charter, the drafters declared the purpose of the United Nations to be not
only the maintenance of peace and security, but also the promotion of respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms.13o On December 10, 1948, the General Assembly
adopted and proclaimed the Declaration so that every Member State would strive, "by
progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective
recognition and observance."'31 Article 3 of the Declaration states that "[e]veryone has
126. The Philippines, THE COALITION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN, http://
www.catwinternational.org/factbook/philippines.php (last visited May 15, 2011); Anti-Trafficking in Persons
Act of 2003, Rep. Act No. 9208, § 1 (May 26, 2003) (Phil.).
127. See, e.g., MEREDITH RALSTON & EDNA KEEBLE, RELUCIANT BEDFELLOWS: FEMINISM, AcTvIsm
AND PROSTITUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES 89, 94-95 (Kumarian Press 2009). Such factors as poverty, coloni-
alism, and the local sexist culture have led to a firm establishment of the sex industry. With the withdrawal of
the U.S. military bases from the Philippines, sex tourism took the place of military prostitution.
128. Philippines Official Says Nation's Tourism Industry Suffering After Manila Hostage Tragedy, PEOPLE'S DAILY
ONLINE, Sept. 4, 2010, http://Cnglish.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7128968.html.
129. RALSTON & KEEBLE, supra note 127, at 84-86.
130. U.N. Charter pmbl.
131. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl.
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the right to life, liberty and security of person," while Article 5 states that "[n]o one shall
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 132
The Philippine government's handling of the crisis raised strong suspicions of viola-
tions of Articles 3 and 5 because, as experts commented, poor negotiation skills and the
poorly equipped SWAT team subjected the people on the bus to unnecessary torture and
led to the deaths of eight passengers.133 Indeed, these concerns were mirrored in a letter
to Claro S. Cristobal, Philippine Consulate General, dated August 24, 2010, by the Hong
Kong Human Rights Monitor, which urged that an in-depth independent inquiry of the
tragedy be conducted by human rights experts and credible forensic autopsy experts.134
Some scholars argue that if the ICJ tries to enforce human rights treaties, it supplants
the role of the Human Rights Council and other U.N. treaty monitoring bodies, which
"produce 'soft law' that may have persuasive," but not controlling, authority.135 Never-
theless, this highly restrictive view of the ICJ's role is unwarranted. The Declaration,
being an extension of the U.N. Charter, should function "as a source of law in interna-
tional human rights decision-making." 36 Article I of the Charter states that one of the
main purposes of the United Nations involves "promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion."137 Because the Charter does not define those rights and freedoms,
the Declaration constitutes an extension of the Charter by specifying what they are.'38
Moreover, the Declaration and what it embodies has attained the status of customary
international law.139 According to Article 38 of its statute, the ICJ, whose function is to
decide disputes submitted to it in accordance with international law, shall apply interna-
tional conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized
by the contesting states, international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law, general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, or judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law."' 40 Because the ICJ looks upon the Declaration as
an authoritative document containing the basic principles of law and established principles
of human rights, the ICJ could enforce the Declaration in the Manila dispute.141
132. Id. arts. 3, 5.
133. See id.
134. Open Letter from Hong Kong Human Rights Consul General Claro S. Cristobal, Philippine General
Consulate in Hong Kong, (Aug. 24, 2010), available at www.hkhrm.org.hk/resource/let-
ter24aug2010consul.doc. The letter demanded a detailed report about the police's conversations with Men-
doza, justifications for the ways that the negotiations were handled, and for the strategies undertaken by the
SWAT police, as well as evaluations of whether the current policies and training for the SWAT team in
handling hostage incidents comply with international human rights standards. The letter also urged the
Philippine government to conduct full investigations of the accusations that had been leveled at Mendoza, his
brother, and the bus driver and fair trials for the driver and Mendoza's brother.
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Nevertheless, the Declaration does not provide standards that are robust or detailed
enough for the ICJ to adjudicate the Manila dispute. The Philippine government's han-
dling of the crisis, including its poor negotiation skills and the poorly equipped SWAT
team, might only indicate only ordinary or gross negligence, not necessarily human rights
violations. Although negligence and human rights violations are not mutually exclusive
and often related, the lack of detailed, robust international legal standards would likely
pose a tremendous difficulty for the ICJ. The Court, relying upon minute, disputable
facts of the tragedy, would have to conduct a fact-dependent inquiry to determine whether
the Philippine government indeed denied the hostages their "right to life, liberty and
security of person," and whether its police force subjected the hostages to "torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 42 The lack of detailed, robust
standards in the Declaration combined with the fact-dependent inquiry would lead to
uncertain adjudication outcomes. Unless more detailed, robust standards are laid out,
similar hostage incidents should not be taken to the ICJ; even if they are, the Court might
well refuse to adjudicate them.
b. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages: A Far Less Direct
Method
Alternatively, the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, to which
both China and the Philippines are parties, might provide an opportunity-albeit a far less
direct one-for China to take the dispute to the ICJ. Article 16, paragraph I states that if
the parties have failed to settle on the interpretation or application of the Convention by
negotiation, then one party can request that the case be submitted to arbitration; if the
parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration within six months of this
request, one party "may refer the dispute to the ICJ in conformity with the Statute of the
Court." 43 A key article pertinent to the interpretation of the Convention is Article 3,
which states that "[t]he State Party in the territory of which the hostage is held by the
offender shall take all measures it considers appropriate to ease the situation of the hos-
tage, in particular, to secure his release and, after his release, to facilitate, when relevant,
his departure."' 44
While the Philippine police made the right decision to attempt negotiation with Men-
doza, they acted inappropriately by arresting his brother, who they later suspected to be
Mendoza's accomplice, and using him as a negotiator. The Philippine government did
not do anything wrong by refusing to yield to his demands.145 Scholars and negotiation
specialists have argued that instead of yielding to terrorist demands to free hostages, a
government should safeguard its fundamental interests to retain public faith and avoid
creating incentives for additional hostage taking in the future.146 If the Philippine govern-
ment had offered Mendoza money to save the hostages, only to retract the offer once the
hostages were safe, it would cause its people to lose their faith in the government; if the
142. U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Feb. 9, 2000, available at http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html.
143. U.N. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, supra note 90.
144. Id. art. 3, T[ 1.
145. See, e.g., Michael Ross Fowler, The Relevance of Principled Negotiations to Hostage Crises, 12 THIRv.
NEGOT. L. REv. 251, 269-70 (2007).
146. See id.
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government did not retract the offer to Mendoza, then its actions would likely lead to
more hostage taking. Nevertheless, the government must look for options that it would
find acceptable and that the terrorists would prefer to the use of force.147 It failed in this
endeavor when Mendoza rejected its promise to review his case.
The fatal act was not the government's failure to settle with Mendoza, however, but its
failure to establish what scholars describe as a "true working relationship" with him, one
that is "forward-looking and problem-solving" and not "condemnatory."48 Handcuffing
Mendoza's brother, whom they treated as his accomplice, would seem reasonable in nor-
mal circumstances. But because the police reasonably knew that their act of handcuffing
Mendoza's brother and forcing him into the car would be shown on the television on the
bus, they were openly condemning Mendoza's conduct.149 Based on the official report,
this display marked the turning point in the incident and led Mendoza, who was hitherto
calm and understanding, to open fire on his victims. 5 0
The Convention provides China and opportunity to take the dispute to the ICJ. The
Philippine government violated Article 3 by failing to take "all measures it considers ap-
propriate" to secure the release of the hostages. The government itself accused its Chief
of Police of failing to use the better-equipped police commando unit to storm the bus and
conduct a timely rescue of the victims.15 Unfortunately, the Philippine government has
not commented upon its arrest of Mendoza's brother. Therefore, since the Philippine
government apparently cannot agree with Hong Kong/China on what the Article 3 "ap-
propriate measures" were, China could act under Article 16 to request that the case be
submitted to arbitration. If they are not able to agree on the organization of the arbitra-
tion within six months of this request, China may then refer the dispute to the ICJ. This
method of taking the dispute to the ICJ, while seemingly viable, is very indirect. Again,
the ICJ would lack robust, detailed international norms to adjudicate the dispute on such
grounds. Hence, China/ Hong Kong should instead make a direct claim to the Philip-
pines through diplomatic channels.
II. The ICJ or Other Settlement Mechanisms? Applying the Framework
to Disputes
Despite the lack of clear laws or robust, detailed legal standards in adjudicating the
Manila hostage tragedy, it is understandable that the public has instinctively thought of
the ICJ as a possible forum of dispute settlement. After all, international adjudication
symbolizes the rule of law in international affairs. If many states are willing to submit
their disputes to impartial settlement and show respect for the ICJ, the public will take
this as a sign that international law is worthy of respect and will support it accordingly.' 52
Nevertheless, Lauterpacht writes, "if States were to submit all their justiciable disputes to
147. Id. at 305.
148. See id. at 271.
149. See id.
150. Lee, supra note 70.
151. Id.
152. E.g., Bilder, supra note 93, at 493.
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the ICJ, that tribunal would be unable to cope with the burden of the work." 53 While the
ICJ "may not efficiently and quickly respond to the demands of its clients" because of its
limited resources, over the past years it has taken a series of measures to simplify its proce-
dures to become more accessible.' 5 4 In addition, disputing parties should lessen the bur-
den of the ICJ by making reasonable, intelligent decisions on whether to submit their
cases to the Court.
The last section of the paper will look briefly at two cases, the Moscow theatre hostage
crisis in 2002 and the ongoing detainment of three American hikers by the Iranian gov-
ernment. It will elucidate how disputing parties should use the framework developed in
Part II, especially factors concerning applicable laws and foreseeable mutual benefits to
disputing states, to determine whether to submit their disputes to the ICJ or to resort to
less formal dispute settlement methods.
A. Moscow THEATRE HOSTAGE CRISIS
On October 23, 2002, armed Chechens who claimed allegiance to the Islamist militant
separatist movement in Chechnya took a large Moscow theatre hostage to demand the
withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya.ss The leader told the hostages that the
militants had no grudge against foreign nationals and promised to release anyone who
showed a foreign passport.56 The Russian negotiators refused to accept this offer and
insisted that everyone be released.157 After two-and-a-half days, Russian Spetsnaz forces
pumped a toxic agent into the theatre's ventilation system and raided it, which led to the
death of more than one hundred hostages, including nine foreigners.iss The rescue oper-
ation allegedly violated the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty.iss After the tragedy,
former hostages sought compensation for physical and emotional suffering but the Mos-
cow city authorities denied their claims.SO In 2003, plaintiffs from Russia, the Ukraine,
the Netherlands, and Kazakhstan turned to the European Court for Human Rights
(ECHR), which accepted the case.' 6 '
The foreign nationals, shunned by the Moscow authorities, made the correct decision
to bring the dispute to the ECHR. If they had not turned to the ECHR, then their
153. Firew Kebede Tiba, What Caused the Multiplicity of international Courts and Tribunals, 10 GONZAGA J.
INTr'L L. 202, 208 (2006-07).
154. Id. at 209. These measures include revising certain provisions of the Court's rules, providing practical
methods for the increasing number of decisions that it rendered each year, and cooperating with dispute
parties to reduce the number and volume of written pleadings and the length of oral arguments. These would
need to be complemented by efforts of U.N. Member States to provide the Court with more funds.
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nations should have initiated a claim before the ICJ on their behalf, even though the ICJ
does not have compulsory jurisdiction over Russia.162 The Moscow situation is similar to
the Manila hostage tragedy in that the Russian authorities rejected the claims by the vic-
tims and that the incident attracted attention from international media, which eliminated
any opportunity to keep it private. But unlike Manila there was no uncertainty about
applicable laws in the Moscow case. Russia allegedly violated the Chemical Weapons
Convention Treaty.163 A violation of the Treaty means that the Organization for the Pro-
hibition of Chemical Weapons could request an advisory opinion from the ICJ.'6 If Rus-
sia consented to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, then the dispute could be disposed of through
open, impersonal adjudication.16 5 If Russia did not consent and if the ICJ decided that it
did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute, then the initiation of claims by the disputing
states would hopefully pressure Russia to negotiate with the victims and compensate them,
benefiting its foreign relations. None of this has happened during the years since the
incident occurred, likely because the ECHR provided a far more convenient forum than
the ICJ for such purposes.
B. IRAN AND THE THREE AMERICAN HIKERs: AN UNFINISHED STORY
After the positive example of the Moscow theatre hostage crisis, it is interesting to see
how the factors examined in Part II apply to one of the latest crises-Iran's detainment of
three American hikers. On July 31, 2009, three Americans were arrested by Iranian bor-
der guards while they were hiking in Iraqi Kurdistan.166 The exact circumstances of their
detainment are unclear. Not only were the Americans denied access to counsel, but all
contact with their families was cut off until May 2010, when their mothers went to Iran to
stay with them for two days.167 In August 2010, the Iranian government reiterated its
belief that the trio should stand trial for "illegal entry," although it was considering other
charges, such as intentionally acting against Iranian security.168 On September 14, 2010,
female detainee Sarah Shourd was released, but the two male hikers are currently still in
Evin Prison.169
If the United States wants to bring a claim against Iran on behalf of the detainees after
their release, it should not resort to the ICJ, but instead should consider other dispute
settlement methods. Neither the United States nor Iran falls under the compulsory juris-
diction of the ICJ.170 But the ICJ has jurisdiction to hear the dispute because both parties
signed the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Amity
162. International Court of Justice Website, supra note 88.
163. Marcus, supra note 159.
164. Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty art. XIV, [ 5, Jan. 13, 1993, 1993 U.S.T. Lexis 107, available at
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Treaty).171 Article XXI of the Amity Treaty stipulates that any dispute between two states
"as to the interpretation or the application of the" treaty shall be submitted to the ICJ,
unless they "agree to settlement by other specific means."172 Like the hostage incidents in
both Manila and Moscow, this case has drawn a lot of media attention, so there is little
reason to try to keep it private. Nevertheless, other factors weigh against the submission
of the claim to the ICJ. Like Manila, there is much uncertainty concerning what laws
govern the detainment of American hikers by Iran. The ICJ may decide to give as much
consideration to Iran's security laws as to the Declaration's human rights values. Hence,
the outcome of the adjudication would be very uncertain. In addition, because of the
already difficult relationship between the two nations, taking the case to the ICJ may not
be beneficial for either party. The United States should use less formal methods like
negotiation, mediation, or making a direct claim via diplomatic channels to reach a better
outcome.
Epilogue
When Jason Leung began to gradually regain consciousness in late October 2010,
Hong Kong citizens cried for joy on the Facebook pages they had set up to give him
blessings during the two months he was unconscious.173 The celebratory atmosphere has
not drowned out the anger and frustration they feel toward the Philippine government,
nor the urgent, steady call for the Hong Kong government to pursue the case on behalf of
the victims and their families.174 On a local level, this hostage tragedy has united the
Hong Kong populace and made them rethink their lives, treasure their relationships with
their families, and reaffirm their faith in humanity. On a global level, it remains to be seen
how the dispute will finally be resolved. This article has argued that, even if the ICJ had
jurisdiction over the dispute, it would be not be a proper forum because of the uncertainty
of applicable laws. Nevertheless, the incident provides a good opportunity for lawyers and
scholars specializing in international law to reexamine dispute settlement methods, de-
velop a framework guiding the methods' applications to different crisis situations, and
promote the significance of international law and world order through the ICJ.
171. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, U.S.-Iran, art. XXI, 1 2, Aug. 15, 1955, 8
U.S.T. 899.
172. Id.
173. Min Lee, Jason Leung, Teen Victim in Philippines Bus Tragedy, Wakes From Coma, HUFFINGTON POST,
Aug. 20, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/20/jason-leung-teen-victim-i n-769659.html.
174. See id.
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